







ROAR, the University of East London Institutional Repository: http://roar.uel.ac.uk  
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please 
scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this 
item and our policy information available from the repository home page for further 
information. 
 
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription.  
 
Author(s): Harper, DJ and Speed, E. 
Article Title: Uncovering recovery:  The resistible rise of recovery and resilience 
Year of publication: 2012 
Citation: Harper, D. and Speed, E. (2012) ‘Uncovering recovery:  The resistible rise 
of recovery and resilience’. Studies in Social Justice, Special Issue on the politics of 
resilience and recovery in mental health care, [In press]. 
 
 
Link to published version:  
Not yet published, but will be made available at 
http://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/SSJ/index  
 
Publisher statement:  
“Studies in Social Justice provides open access to all of its content on the principle 
that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global 
exchange of knowledge.”  
 









Discourses of recovery and resilience have risen to positions of dominance in 
the mental health field. Models of recovery and resilience enjoy purchase, in 
both policy and practice, across a range of settings from self-described 
psychiatric survivors through to mental health charities through to statutory 
mental health service providers.  Despite this ubiquity, there is confusion about 
what recovery means.  In this article we problematize notions of recovery and 
resilience, and consider what, if anything, should be recovered from these 
concepts. We focus on three key issues, i) individualisation, ii) the persistence 
of a deficit model, and iii) collective approaches to recovery. Through 
documentary analysis we consider these issues across third sector 
organisations, and public and mental health policy. 
 
Firstly, definitional debates about recovery reflect wider ideological debates 
about the nature of mental health.  The vagueness of these concepts and 
implicit assumptions inherent in dominant recovery and resilience discourses 
render them problematic because they individualise what are social problems.  
Secondly, recovery has developed in a way that continues to draw on a notion 
of deficit, for example recovery, as championed by Anthony and others, does 
not do this. Instead the emphasis is placed on turning negatives into positives. 
We argue that this does little to substantially transform dominant 
understandings of psychological distress.  Thirdly, these issues combine to 
impact upon the progressive potential of recovery. It comes to be seen as an 
individualistic experiential narrative accompaniment to medical understandings 
where the structural causes of distress are obscured. This in turn impacts upon 
the potential for recovery to be used to explore more collective, political aspects 
of emotional distress. 
 
Drawing on the work of Fraser, we use this critique to characterise ‘recovery’ as 
a ‘struggle for recognition’, founded on a model of identity politics which 
displaces and marginalises the need for social, political and economic 
redistribution to address many of the underlying causes of emotional distress. 
We conclude by stating that it is only when the collective, structural experiences 
of inequality and injustice are explicitly linked to processes of emotional distress 




People who experience psychological distress also experience social 
injustice.  This injustice impacts upon their social, economic and political lives. 
For example, the social patterning of distress reflects broader social 
inequalities (Mirowsky & Ross, 2003) as does people’s experience of mental 
health services (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2003, Pilgrim, 2009).  Furthermore, the 
acquisition of psychiatric diagnoses may also present barriers to full time 
employment, or create barriers to housing (Social Exclusion Unit, 2004). 
These barriers to full social, political and economic participation can be 
characterized as a problem of redistributive justice (Fraser, 2000). Mental 
health service users and survivors also experience devalued identities 
through the acquisition of psychiatric diagnoses. Fraser, (2000) identifies this 
as a problem of recognition, whereby a normatively framed ‘negative’ aspect 
of identity stigmatizes a particular group. One of the sources of such 
devaluation is the way in which psychiatric terminology is deficit-laden and 
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pathologising (e.g. Gergen, 1990).  However, in recent years, the popular and 
professional literature has become increasingly dominated by concepts that 
appear to reject a deficit-based approach.  In this article we focus on two of 
these concepts in more detail:  recovery and resilience.  We consider the 
possibilities these concepts offer people in the mental health field, in 
particular, in terms of struggles around the politics of recognition and 
redistribution. We provide a perspective from the UK, where the recovery 
approach has been gradually appearing in mental health policy over the last 
decade (Perkins and Slade, 2012).   
 
That the notion of recovery has moved from being a marginal to a central 
concern in mental health services in the UK (Pilgrim, 2008), North America 
(Anthony, 1991, 1993), Australia and New Zealand (Australian Health 
Ministers, 2003; O’Hagan, 2001; Ramon et al, 2007) and elsewhere in a 
relatively short amount of time is striking. Although proponents argue that the 
focus on recovery and resilience is a uniformly positive development, in this 
article we problematize this stance.  As with many taken for granted concepts, 
there are a number of unintended consequences that flow from their use in a 
policy context – consequences that may not be obvious to many survivors and 
professionals and which may even be inconsistent with the stated aims of 
authors.  Moreover, these developments have tended to be framed within a 
broad framework informed by identity politics. This has significant implications 
for issues of social and distributive justice in terms of mental health service 
users and survivors.  
 
In this paper, we will critique three aspects of discourse related to recovery 
and resilience as they are utilized in policy frameworks.  Firstly, we argue that 
these concepts are individualistic, based on medicalised and neoliberal 
notions of individual responsibility.  This individualism is commensurate with 
the rise of neoliberal identity politics, focused on individualizing disparate 
group struggles of recognition rather than collective struggles around 
redistribution. Secondly, we contend that, rather than banishing deficit, 
recovery and resilience discourse simply reframes deficits as strengths and is 
thus implicitly reliant on deficit-based models.  This failure to challenge the 
underlying deficit inherent in contemporary notions of recovery results in a 
situation whereby ‘recovery’ can be seen to present barriers to social and 
political participation.  In turn this can be seen as extending (rather than 
limiting) the stigmatization of the identified group (i.e. perpetuating their status 
subordination, see Fraser, 2000, 2005, 2007). Finally, we note how important 
structural factors (health and social inequalities) are de-emphasized and 
backgrounded within a neoliberally informed framework of ‘identity politics’.   
 
These three aspects of recovery and resilience obstruct rather than facilitate 
efforts to improve the situations of mental health service users/survivors, 
obscuring the social and polticial links between distress and structural 
injustice.  Moreover, the focus on the individual means that the collective 
responses to injustice seen in the activities of the broader Survivor Movement 
are downplayed.  Finally, the failure to escape deficit-laden discourse means 




The paper includes both a documentary and conceptual analysis of the 
concepts, focusing primarily on recovery (since this concept is founded on an 
assumption of resilience).  First we define the concepts. 
 
Defining resilience and recovery 
 
The Nature of Resilience 
 
Resilience refers to an ability to respond to and cope with adversity. 
Supporting evidence for resilience as an aspect of mental health includes a 
consistent research finding that rates of mental distress vary between people 
from apparently similar backgrounds (Joseph, 2003).   Similarly, Goldberg & 
Huxley, (1992) discuss the notion of spontaneous restitution whereby a 
proportion of people experiencing mental distress spontaneously improve 
without external intervention.  Resilience was promoted by the humanistic 
psychotherapies in the 1940s and 1950s, and the human potential movement 
of the 1960s promulgated the notion of self-healing human beings.  In terms 
of the historical development of ‘resilience’, these approaches combined with 
libertarian professional movements (such as the 1970s radical non-
interventionist social work).  By the late 1980s there was a move towards 
solution-focused therapy (de Shazer, 1988) and, within mainstream 
psychology, towards positive psychology (Seligman, 1998). This entailed 
creating a research paradigm where the emphasis was on psychological 
processes that were deemed to be protective or ameliorating rather than 
those which were deemed to focus on deficits. It is in these broad therapeutic 
contexts that the problematic notions of resilience and recovery developed. 
 
One important distinction to be made is between the term ‘recovery’ and the 
notion of recovery. Many commentators conflate the two, which can lead to 
confusion.  Thus Chamberlin’s groundbreaking On our own (1978) is 
sometimes credited as part of the history of the recovery movement.  
However, the actual term ‘recovery’ only appears twice in the whole book, 
both times mentioned only in passing. 
 
As Davidson et al (2005) note ‘[t]he only thing about which most stakeholders 
seem to be able to agree, in fact, is that the notion of recovery has become 
the focus of a considerable amount of confusion and debate between and 
among various constituencies within the mental health community’ (p.480).  
The origins of the recovery model in mental health lie in the work of William 
Anthony (e.g. Anthony, 1991, 1993).  Broadly speaking, it is a highly 
individualized and experiential concept, which proposes a framework for 
‘recovery’ from ‘mental illness’, based on individual changes to attitudes, 
behaviors and beliefs by the psychiatric patient. Anthony notes that the work 
of survivors like Deegan (see Deegan, 1998) was one of the inspirations for 
this approach and Deegan does, indeed use both the concept and the term 
‘recovery’.   
 
In the context of this paper, it is worthy of note that survivor groups tend to 
place more emphasis on the work of Deegan and other survivors, in their use 
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of ‘recovery’.  Pilgrim (2008) delineates three competing versions of the 
recovery approach:  a biomedical version focused solely on an improvement 
in symptomatology; a more socially-oriented model, in the tradition of 
psychiatric rehabilitation, focused on improvements in symptoms and quality 
of life; and a psychiatric survivor movement approach focused on liberation 
rather than cure.  For example, for those survivors who popularize notions of 
recovery - like Deegan (1998) - their main concern is, arguably, to critique the 
narrow limits of traditional notions of rehabilitation and with developing 
narratives of hope, rather than delineating a model per se.  Moreover, some 
survivors see the notion of recovery as the antithesis of a reductive 
professional-led model –Coleman (1999) explicitly advocates a political notion 
of recovery, contrasting it against a psychiatric conceptualization.  Dillon 
(2011) also outlines a political and collective approach to recovery, 
contrasting it with a biomedical approach, arguing that ‘[i]mproving all of our 
personal experiences means that we must collectively address oppressive 
political structures.  This for me is why the personal is political’  (2011, p.157). 
We return to this issue later.  
Within the literature, Anthony’s is not the only model (see, for example 
Jacobson & Greenley, 2001).  In their review of recovery models Leamy et al 
(2011) examined 97 separate contributions.  In addition, there have been 
attempts to clarify, through qualitative research with service users/survivors, 
key elements in accounts of recovery from distress (e.g. Adame & Hornstein, 
2006; Adame & Knudson, 2008; Cohen, 2005; Ochocka et al., 2005; Young & 
Ensing, 1999). This range of competing versions means that specific concepts 
of recovery are often vague. We present some analysis of policy documents 
to offer some empirical grounding to the ways in which recovery is being used 
in a practical context. We identify three key problems. 
 
Three problematic aspects of recovery and resilience discourse 
 
We now proceed by demonstrating the three elements of this critique through 
documentary analysis, before relating this analysis to wider concerns around 
social justice. 
 
1.  Individualization 
 
No health without mental health (Department of Health, 2011) is ‘a cross-
government mental health outcomes strategy’ intended to establish parity of 
treatment between services for people with mental and physical health 
problems. In one sense, it can be regarded as an attempt to redress some of 
the status subordination experienced by mental health service users. It is 
selected for analysis here because it offers a governmental narrative of how 
recovery is defined and operationalized in a policy context.  
Recovery is explicitly defined in section two of the strategy, under the 
heading of “Guiding Values and Principles”.  These are listed as 
‘freedom, fairness, and responsibility,” (page 16). The definition of 
recovery is listed under the first of these values (freedom). Within this 
definition, recovery is defined through reference to a detailed footnote 
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that defines recovery as follows: 
* The term ‘recovery’ has developed a specific meaning in mental 
health. It has been defined as: ‘A deeply personal, unique process 
of changing one’s attitudes, values, feelings, goals, skills and/or 
roles. It is a way of living a satisfying, hopeful and contributing life, 
even with limitations caused by the illness. Recovery involves the 
development of new meaning and purpose in one’s life’ (Anthony, 
1993)... Although the term is not used in relation to children and 
young people, the underlying principles of the recovery approach 
are equally applicable. 
This quote from Anthony offers the most frequently used interpretation of what 
recovery is, and how it relates to a person’s mental health. The onus for 
recovery is on the individual, whereby that individual must change their 
attitudes, values, feelings, goals, skills and roles, in a deeply personal way, in 
order to effect change within their own life.  Rather than effecting social 
change, the marginalized other is required to change their personal outlook. 
By failing to problematize the medical model, Anthony’s model requires that 
the person accept that they have an ‘illness’ (i.e. that they endorse the 
medical model). Recovery is thus framed as the need for the service user to 
acknowledge the inappropriateness of their ‘negative’ beliefs, values and 
behaviors and to rethink these ‘inappropriate’ cognitions and behaviors into a 
set of more satisfying, hopeful and contributory values and behaviors. This 
model of recovery makes emotional distress an explicit problem of 
individualized identity, rather than for example, an effect of structural 
inequality. 
 
The individualized personal nature of recovery is a central theme across 
another UK policy document, this time from Rethink, a leading UK mental 
health membership charity. The document is entitled 100 ways to support 
Recovery (Slade, 2009).  Like the cross government strategy this document 
draws from the work of Anthony to provide a framework for recovery but adds 
a distinction between ‘personal recovery’ (seen as within the domain of the 
‘expertise of people with lived experience of mental illness’) and ‘clinical 
recovery’ (seen as within the domain of the ‘expertise of mental health 
professionals’). Clinical recovery is concerned with the eradication of 
symptoms, the restoration of ‘social functioning’ and other ways of ‘getting 
back to normal’, (p.4). This distinction functions to effectively locate ‘personal 
recovery’ as an adjunct to clinical recovery, and this complementarity avoids 
recovery being seen as inherently contested. 
 
The document outlines four “Personal Recovery Tasks” (p.4). These are listed 
as: 
i) developing a positive identity; 
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ii) framing the ‘mental illness’1
iii) self-managing the mental illness 
; 
iv) developing valued social roles 
We focus on the third task, which illustrates an important aspect of an 
individualistic approach to recovery:  responsibilisation.  Neoliberal policies 
invite people to see certain problems as the responsibility of the individual 
rather than, for example, the State.  As a result, taking personal responsibility 
(through self-management) of the ‘mental illness experience’ (p.4) entails, as 
Lemke argues  “shifting the responsibility for social risks such as illness, 
unemployment, poverty, etc., and for life in society into the domain for which 
the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of ‘self-care’” 
(Lemke, 2001, p.201). For example, the document states, “framing the mental 
illness experience provides a context in which it becomes one of life’s 
challenges, allowing the ability to self-manage to develop. The transition is 
from being clinically managed to taking personal responsibility through self-
management,” (p.4). This programme of self-care, Lemke argues, is tightly 
aligned with neoliberal forms of government, which “characteristically develop 
indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals without at the same 
time being responsible for them,” (p.201). An example of this can be seen in 
the document where it notes self-care “does not mean doing everything on 
your own. It means being responsible for your own well-being, including 
seeking help and support from others when necessary,” (p.4).  
Elsewhere in the document there is a direct comparison between traditional 
approaches and recovery approaches. Under a section entitled “Goals of the 
Service” (p.6) traditional approaches are defined as ‘anti-disease’ whereas 
recovery approaches are defined as ‘pro-health’. Similarly, ‘compliance’ is 
contrasted with ‘choice’, ‘and a traditional ‘return to normal’ is contrasted with 
a recovered ‘transformation’. This demonstrates a clear attempt to ‘positivise’ 
recovery-oriented services. Self-management and patient choice are key 
elements of neoliberal health policy. These ascriptions are of a piece with 
other ideological processes that seek to define service users as 
responsibilised consumers. This idea is further iterated in the fourth point of 
the goals of service criteria. Previously traditional services sought a return to 
normal, whereas, recovery services, we are told, seek transformation. This 
transformation is construed in terms of the individual service user, not in terms 
of the wider structural conditions of inequality.  This obviously has implications 
for the shape of policy initiatives to reduce mental health service users and 
survivors experience of social injustice. The championing of practices of 
choice, self-control and personal transformation are compatible with neoliberal 
forms of healthcare provision intended to produce responsibilised 
individualized service users. One way in which this has been manifested in 
traditional service approaches has been in linking distress with internal deficits 
and recovery with internal strengths.  It is to the centrality of the notion of 
deficit that we turn next.                                                         1 Possible alternate meanings for the ‘illness’ are offered in the context of ‘spiritual, cultural or existential crises’.  
However, although other frameworks are alluded to, the lack of a sustained analysis of structural factors risks 
those identified factors being regarded primarily as lifestyle factors. 
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2.  The Persistence of Deficit 
 
The second element of our critique is that recovery and resilience discourse 
continues to be implicitly reliant on a model of deficit. Consider again the 2011 
strategy document, ’No health without mental health’. 
 
The strategy is organized around six key strategy goals.  Each goal has an 
accompanying explanation that identifies specific examples of the overall 
goal.  Limitations of space mean we can only focus on one goal here:  ‘more 
people with mental health problems will recover’.  The accompanying 
explanation identifies seven indicative examples: 
 
More people who develop mental health problems will have a good 
quality of life – greater ability to manage their own lives, stronger 
social relationships, a greater sense of purpose, the skills they need 
  for living and working, improved chances in education, better 
employment rates and a suitable and stable place to live. (p. 6). 
This extract contains a number of features that clearly imply a particular 
underlying aetiology of emotional distress. Implicit in this model is an 
assertion that people who develop mental health problems have a poor 
quality of life, are unable to manage their own lives, lack strong social 
relationships, have a lesser sense of purpose, lack necessary skills for 
living and working, have lesser opportunities for education, employment 
and poorer access to secure housing. All of these characteristics are 
predicated on existing negatives (deficits) being reframed as potential 
positives.  
A deficit model persists in that, although framed in positive terms, each 
positive term is dependent for its meaning on the opposite negative term.  
Billig et al (1988) note how this is a common feature of thinking and 
talking. A focus on strengths does not do away with the notion that there 
are deficits; indeed they are predicated upon an underlying and enduring 
deficit model.  This model is normative, accentuating the ‘positive’ 
aspects of deficits, rather than challenging the ontology of the deficit 
model. As such, it reifies difference and sustains the subordinated status 
of mental health service users.  
This approach to recovery approach does not offer an alternative means 
of understanding the nature of emotional distress; it simply reframes 
existing understandings of mental illness. This is problematic when the 
point of origin of much recovery work was about challenging existing 
notions of mental health and proposing alternative notions of emotional 
distress. Next, we focus on the third element of our critique, the 
backgrounding of structural injustice and collective responses to it. 
 
3.  De-emphasizing structural causes of, and collective responses to, distress 
Earlier, we identified four “Personal Recovery Tasks” (p.4) in 100 ways to 
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support Recovery (Slade, 2009), the fourth of which was ‘developing valued 
social roles’.  A clear emphasis in this fourth criterion is put on relationships 
with others, and the support that this might bring - “Working with the person in 
their social context is vital, especially during times of crisis when support 
usually received from friends, family and colleagues can become most 
strained,” (p.4).  Crucially, the social context is defined in terms of what it 
might add to the interpersonal context. This reduction of the meaning of 
‘social’ to the ‘interpersonal’ prioritizes a very narrow view of the social 
(predicated on personal interaction), and limits the potential for consideration 
of issues of ‘social’ injustice within such a narrow context. 
This is not to say that inequality is ignored in discussions of recovery.  For 
example Jacobson and Greenley’s (2001) model of recovery includes a 
concern with empowerment but this is framed as ‘a sense of empowerment’ 
(p.483) – a psychologized and individualized reading of empowerment -- 
rather than an actual redistribution of power.  Thus inequality is not ignored 
but it is addressed in a narrow individualized form. This prioritizing allows for a 
backgrounding of many of the key issues of social inequality that are known to 
contribute to poor mental health (such as the community-wide impacts of 
living in areas of poverty, see Dorling, 2011). The Rethink document appears 
to accept a priori that social inequality will be present, but places the onus on 
the service user to rearticulate the effects of social inequality in terms of their 
individualized, responsibilised self. This is redolent of the ‘spoiled identity’ of 
the service user implicitly evoked by Anthony, (1993). Slade’s model (directly 
or indirectly) has the effect of minimizing the role and import of social 
inequality in population level rates of emotional distress. It functions to make 
‘mental illness’ an individual problem with personal solutions.  This model 
draws from an individualized rights-based form of identity politics, which, as 
the Social Perspective Network argues, does “not focus enough on the need 
for society to change as well,” (p.56). 
For White (2004b) these kind of accounts obscure context – the opportunities 
or material conditions which facilitate people getting through adversity. Smail 
has made a similar point – that the extent to which people can make changes 
in their lives will depend on their access to powers and resources (e.g. 
educational, physical, social, political and suchlike).  Although, he argues, 
these originate in the external material environment ‘possession of or access 
to such powers will often appear superficially as personal characteristics or 
qualities’ (1990, p.8). These manifestations of responsible individuals speak 
directly to neoliberal models of the service user. In our analysis of these 
documents we have seen a number of recurring themes.  The focus on 
individual journeys, whilst to some degree welcome, also leads to practices of 
atomization (where social processes are reduced to individual elements), 
individualization and responsibilisation.  Moreover, the dominance of medical 
understandings of emotional distress is perpetuated, since the recovery model 
does not challenge them.  The recovery model does not erase the notion of 
deficit; more accurately it reframes it, limiting the potential for developing truly 
alternative models and understanding of the nature of emotional distress.  
Finally, social inequality, whilst acknowledged, is backgrounded and there is a 
tension between the personal and political in that recovery is seen as an 
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individual and personal practice, which simultaneously downplays the role of 
collective and political aspects of distress.  
Individualization, Deficit, Inequality and Social Justice 
Our argument here is not that the personal should be secondary to the 
political, more that an awareness of the need for balance between 
personal and political needs to be acknowledged by practitioners and 
service users. There is a need to rebalance the tension between the 
politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution such that they 
complement rather than contradict each other.  
To do this, we utilize Fraser’s framework founded on notions of status 
(rather than identity) as a means of contextualizing and explaining the 
implications of recovery-based individualization, deficit and inequality in 
relation to questions of social justice (see Fraser, 1995, 2000, 2005, 
2007). We consider how these three factors combine to marginalize 
consideration of more macro level contributors to emotional distress, 
such as conditions of economic inequality (Fraser describes this 
marginalization as a ‘problem of displacement’). Also, we consider how a 
focus on identity underscores rather than disavows differences between 
the pathologized ‘other’ and the normative ‘mainstream’ (Fraser 
describes this as a ‘problem of reification’). We accomplish this through a 
consideration of processes of power and domination in the mental health 
field, particularly in terms of the continuing dominance or hegemony of 
biomedical approaches.  
Recovery and hegemony 
 
We have argued that dominant norms of medicine and indeed government 
are embedded in, and perpetuated by, the mainstream recovery model. 
Consequently, it offers survivors little in the way of alternatives to the present 
medical and politically dominant ways of making sense of emotional distress. 
For example, the recovery model clearly engages with an ‘identity model’ of 
recognition. This model characterizes any negative judgment of a social group 
as a problem of ‘misrecognition’, whereby the majority regards an element of 
the groups’ identity as negative. The task within this frame (for members of 
the minority group) becomes one of making the negative ‘trait’ positive, such 
that the misrecognition might be redressed. The solution to this misrecognition 
is that members of minority groups  
 
“…reject such images in favor of new self-representations of their 
own making, jettisoning internalized, negative identifies and joining 
collectively to produce a self-affirming culture of their own – which 
publicly asserted will gain the respect and esteem of society at 
large,” (Fraser, 2000, p. 110). 
 
The recovery model clearly fits into this political project. The question it begs 
is where the critique of social inequality, or medical power might fit in these 
self-affirmed representations. The recovery model directs attention to the 
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‘positive’ group identity whilst simultaneously failing to problematize the 
conditions (beyond the group) that contributed to the situation; it is blind to the 
wider social and political struggle. It also displaces the political nature of the 
struggle between different power elites and the psychiatric patient that were 
such a central feature to the history of the psychiatric survivor movement. 
Notions of equivalence and difference allow us to bring consideration of this 
political struggle back into the discussion. 
 
Equivalence and Difference 
 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) assert that political struggles can be characterized 
in terms of ‘logics of equivalence’ or ‘logics of difference’. The former relate to 
those struggles where the differences between groups are downplayed to 
create a united front against a common enemy, whereas the latter relate to 
struggles where differences are accentuated. An example of equivalence 
would be a social movement against psychiatry, where differences of class, 
gender, ethnicity etc. would be backgrounded (but not denied) and similarities 
between groups would be accentuated (thus creating a collective banner 
behind which to mobilize – e.g. as psychiatric survivors). However, this 
dynamic is problematic. The logic of equivalence must seek to build a broad 
based movement against a hegemonic power, in a dynamic context that 
acknowledges and embraces difference rather than reifying the collective 
identity; Fraser describes this as an “affirmative recognition of difference” 
(2000, 116), perhaps characterized as a broad coalition.  
 
If the movement does not recognize this difference then the collective 
equivalence between actors risks becoming atrophied. Fraser (2000) touches 
upon this dynamic when she discusses the reification of identity politics. For 
Fraser, there is a tendency for equivalences to become a singular, simplified 
group identity. The promotion of recovery, within the mainstream, as a user-
led process for dealing with emotional distress, lends recovery discourse an 
authenticity that it does not command and imposes a singular “simplified 
group identity which denies the complexity of people’s lives,” (Fraser, 2000, 
112). This singular identity (e.g. as recovering service users) does not pay 
sufficient attention to other ongoing political struggles across different groups 
of actors, such as the dominance of psychiatric pathology or economic 
inequalities and the impact these factors have in perpetuating emotional 
distress.  
 
Relatedly, logics of difference are those strategies intended to amplify 
dissimilarities between and within groups. This logic seeks to break down 
chains of equivalences and to foster differences in order to maintain a position 
of dominance in the field. Consider again the problems of misrecognition. 
Identifying specific groups as deficient or inferior locates them within 
‘institutionalized relations of social subordination’ (Fraser, 2000). 
Institutionalized subordination limits opportunities for participatory parity, and 
therefore marks a clear case of social injustice. Somewhat paradoxically, the 
recovery ‘model’ could be argued to be seeking to redress this disparity, by 
rearticulating this ‘deficit’ within a normative ‘strengths’ framework. However, it 
fails in this regard; by seeking parity through a valorized individualized 
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identity, whilst ignoring the need for institutional social change. The focus on a 
‘recovered’ identity supports dominant norms, and constructs an ‘unrecovered 
identity’ as intrinsically negative. It ignores the need for transformations of 
‘institutionalized value patterns’ (Fraser, 2000), that themselves block 
opportunities for participatory parity. In this context, the focus on individual 
change alone is always doomed to failure in a social justice context. The 
collective survivor movement offers an alternative focus for progressive 
politics.  
 
The Survivor Movement as a Social Justice Movement 
 
Historically, the survivor movement represented an attempt to transform 
medical dominance. It sought to offer a counter-hegemonic strategy, based on 
non-medical understandings of emotional distress, informed by social justice 
and equality. In this sense, it sought to create a logic of equivalence. We do 
not intend to homogenize the survivor movement; like any other movement, it 
comprises cross-cutting currents of thought and action but, we would argue, a 
dispassionate observer of the movement in the 1970s and 1980s would not 
have said that its main concern was recovery per se. Rather, the main 
demands of the movement were to call for the ending of coercive practices 
and the development of ‘patient-controlled alternatives’. Part of this project 
involved developing a focus on the survivor’s individual experience as a 
counter to the totalizing, pathologising discourse of medicine. This resistance 
against universalistic medicine built on the 1960s counter culture (such as 
assertions that the “personal is political”, see Hanisch, 1979), the women’s 
movement and other civil rights campaigns and the anti-psychiatry legacy 
(such as Laing's 1967 work on the politics of experience.  
 
In this contemporary context we suggest that the experiential, personal 
biography element of the survivor movement has been co-opted by 
mainstream politics and medicine, and that the radical redistributive element 
has been marginalized and displaced. Within this co-opted model, recovery is 
concerned with inward transformation as a solution to individual problems, 
whilst the social and political context is backgrounded or ignored. By 
extension, these accounts also privilege professional-led interventions to help 
recovery.  This is problematic as survivors’ accounts show that their journeys 
are extremely diverse with professional involvement playing a part only in 
some narratives (e.g. Adame & Hornstein, 2006; Adame & Knudson, 2008; 
Cohen, 2005; Ochocka, et al., 2005; Young & Ensing, 1999) whilst many 
survivors report ‘experiencing recovery’ only after freeing themselves from 
professional intervention (Thornhill et al., 2004).  That the recovery movement 
has not, for example, led to any serious challenge to the medicalization of 
distress is further evidence of this co-option.  
 
The focus on individual, rather than collective, experience functions to 
accentuate differences between service users and indeed organisations. By 
focusing on individuals the role and potential of collective approaches is 
obscured. By co-opting recovery, and focusing on individuals, there is clearly 
a neglect of the social and material context of emotional distress and, in 
neglecting the impress of power, there is a tendency to voluntarism - the idea 
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that people can simply change through force of will despite countervailing 
structural factors (Smail, 2004). Similarly, many of the real demands of the 
survivor movement have been obscured. As Trivedi (2010) notes, what does 
the recovery approach say about professional power?  One of the striking 
things about the survivor movement has been just that – it is a collective 
political movement (Crossley, 2005, Speed, 2006). Harper (2010) notes the 
24 demands made by the Mental Patients Union (MPU) - set up in the UK in 
late 1972 following an occupation of the Paddington Day Hospital by patients 
and staff (Spandler, 2006). Only nine of these demands have been met, many 
only partially.  The 15 outstanding demands include:  the abolition of 
compulsory treatment and seclusion; the ‘abolition of irreversible psychiatric 
'treatments'’ like ECT, psychosurgery and medication; and that ‘all patients 
should have the right to have any 'treatment' which they believe will help 
them’ (Roberts, 2008).  Claims like these from the survivor movement can be 
regarded as attempts to mobilize a collective campaign, to identify those 
aspects of psychiatric practice that are political, or that speak to a common 
experience. Developing a campaign around these issues would enable 
service users to identify their collective similarity (or equivalence) rather than 
focusing on a politics of misrecognition. It would allow service users to draw 
attention to, and problematize, processes of, social injustice, economic, 
political and social inequality that are so prevalent in the incidence of 
emotional distress. 
 
There is clearly a need to return to the some of the key demands of the 
survivor movement and to consider how to maintain an explicitly 
transformative agenda in mental health research, policy and practice. 
 
Beyond Recovery and resilience:  Alternative Conceptualizations 
 
Given the problems with recovery and resilience discourse what are we to do?  
Can it be reclaimed and used differently in order to achieve greater social 
justice for those in distress?  Or, is it so inherently limited that we need to 
move beyond it and use an entirely different vocabulary? 
 
There are a number of things in favor of the first approach.  Firstly, the term 
‘recovery’ is in wide use in the general population.  Secondly, the recovery 
model is widely known and provides a vehicle for addressing issues of 
injustice and making certain demands, for example that services reorganize 
so they are consistent with political notions of recovery. 
 
However, there are also things in favor of the second approach.  For example, 
whilst the term ‘recovery’ is in wide use, many understand it as a medical 
term, implying recovery from an illness or disease (Wallcraft, 2005).  Although 
there are other non-medical definitions of recovery, the issue is that the term 
itself has an ambiguous meaning.  Because of this, on what basis can we say 
that a mental health service is or is not ‘recovery-oriented’?  How do we deal 
with conflicts between models (e.g. clinical recovery versus personal 
recovery)?  Does it simply become a case of arguing for one’s own definition 
of recovery:  ‘this is what recovery really means …’ or ‘this is what recovery 
means for me’?  
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Rather than seeking a consensus view of what recovery is, it is, perhaps, 
more useful to think about the ways in which some of the underlying principles 
of the survivor movement might lead to a re-invigorated debate about how the 
personal can be made political, such that struggles of recognition can 
complement struggles of redistribution, to effect progressive social change. 
Moreover, if we are to try to move beyond recovery and resilience discourse, 
it is important to consider ways of holding on to elements that are likely to be 
helpful in leading to more socially just outcomes.  
 
In proposing a way forward, it is necessary to identify an approach that 
combines the progressive elements of a politics of recognition with a struggle 
for redistribution. In a mental health context, redistribution would involve 
engaging with the social, political and economic processes that created 
processes of status subordination for service users, across all aspects of 
social, political and economic participation. Fraser, (2000) proposes a solution 
that rejects the identity mode of misrecognition and instead argues for a 
politics of status. This alternative neither reifies subordinated identity nor does 
it displace struggles for redistribution. Instead it seeks to undermine notions of 
group specificity, arguing that it is not a misrecognized identity that is the 
endpoint of any political struggle, but rather the struggle should seek 
‘institutional remedies for institutionalized harms’ that are a consequence of 
misrecognition. A recovery model based on an implicit notion of deficit clearly 
does not accomplish this. But the recovery model is not alone in this regard. 
Fraser argues that any struggle that relies solely on issues of recognition will 
fail. Moves for redistributive justice must be coupled to issues of recognition. 
The economic impact of being identified as a psychiatric patient must be 
considered in conjunction with the social and political impacts of this 
identification. It is only when redistribution and misrecognition are considered 
together that the extent of the social injustice can be gauged in line with the 
best means of addressing it, such that parity of participation can be 
considered. 
 
What should we recover from ‘recovery’? 
 
Firstly, the focus on the individual biographical narratives of survivors seems 
genuinely helpful, as does the notion of each individual going on a personal 
journey.  Secondly, the optimism about the possibility of healing, of engaging 
in a process of change in a person’s relationship to distress is to be 
welcomed.  There is an assumption that all these elements exist because of 
the recovery approach or model but, in fact, they pre-existed the wide use of 
this term. Neither biographical journey narratives nor optimism necessarily 
entail the other conceptual and policy baggage that recovery and resilience 
bring with them as we have described.  Indeed, the way these concepts have 
been implemented in services has led to a number of unintended 
consequences in that the ‘personal’ has become disconnected from the 
‘political’.  Thus, within the recovery and resilience literature there is little 
emphasis on the importance of survivors getting together and sharing 
experiences, even less, that they might seek to act on insights gained in this 
process.  However, in the context of the women’s movement, for example, 
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this link between personal and collective understanding and action was key 
(Hanisch, 1979).  It is necessary that the link between individual narratives 
and wider social, political and economic struggles are strengthened and 
maintained. Possible alternatives need to value individual narratives but place 
them in a collective context, developing explanatory accounts that are not 
located intra-psychically but rather, which are attentive to the structural 
conditions which might facilitate ‘coming through’ adversity or ‘moving 
forward’ (Ochocka et al., 2005) and which also acknowledge the impact of 
social inequalities on aetiology and the ability to change in relation to distress. 
 
In focusing on the power of individual survivor narratives it is important not to 
simply appropriate them so as to insert them into professionally derived 
conceptual frameworks.  Instead more socially just frameworks are required, 
more fully grounded in everyday experience. These might include not only 
accounts of their distress but also problematic relationships with health 
services. Or address power disparities in relation to professionals and 
clashing viewpoints on the nature of that distress, or indeed broader issues of 
inequality around class, ethnicity, gender or sexuality.  In understanding 
distress there is a need for more sophisticated understandings of experience 
(Trivedi, 2010), framed in people’s own words, using the language that 
survivors themselves use (Wallcraft & Michaelson, 2001).  However, these 
narratives need to be understood in a collective and political and economic 
context.  It is no surprise that some of the most inspiring personal accounts 
occur at survivor-run conferences like Intervoice’s2
In this regard, Boyle (2003) suggests a focus on aetiology that examines the 
social and societal causes of distress.  In her discussion of another 
individualized and psychologized concept – that of ‘vulnerability’, Boyle 
suggests that one alternative is to focus on the external causes of things to 
which people are supposedly vulnerable: 
 annual international 
hearing voices conference attended by equal numbers of survivors and 
professionals.  At such events, the individual is not simply relating a 
biographical narrative, rather they are giving a public testimony, often 
intended to lead to changes in services – here, the personal is 
indistinguishable from the political. 
 
Then, rather than simply naming the damage, we might gradually name 
the systems or people who do the damage, eventually making them the 
subject of our sentences … [w]e might also take up Paul Gilbert’s 
recent suggestion (2002) and have a ‘Defeat abuse’, rather than 
‘Defeat depression’ campaign. 
 
       Boyle (2003,p.30) 
 
Such a focus might lead us to identify the structural facilitators of recovery 
(e.g. stable income, good housing, employment etc.).  Another way of 
examining the social context is to look towards approaches that firmly locate 
the individual in their social and societal context. Hagan and Smail (1997a,b)                                                         2 http://www.intervoiceonline.org/ 
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for example, introduce the notion of power-mapping.  This is a process of 
identifying with a service user what access they have to a whole range of 
resources (e.g. personal, bodily, interpersonal, social, financial etc.).  Burton 
and Kagan’s (2008) societal case formulation provides another way of doing 
this. The aim in these kinds of approaches is a form of collective 
conscientization (Freire, 1974) – where people come to understand the 
structural causes of their oppression. Smail talks of the related notion of 
‘outsight’ which he contrasts with what he terms ‘magical voluntarist’ forms of 
therapeutic help – that is, approaches which are based on the assumption 
that, perhaps with the expert help of a therapist, a person is able to change 
the way they think about the world through sheer force of will, rather than 
attempt to change the world that causes them distress. 
 
If the aim of magical voluntarist psychology is to achieve the kind of 
‘insight’ that allows the person to see the error of their ways and adjust 
their conduct accordingly, the aim of a social environmentalist 
psychology is more or less completely the opposite:  to help the person 
achieve ‘outsight’, such that the causes of distress can be demystified 
and the extent of their own responsibility for their condition put into its 
proper perspective. 
 
Smail (2005, p.32) 
  
Conclusion - Challenging the Binary? 
 
Our critique leads to two key conclusions. Firstly, there is a need for the 
implications and limitations of recovery and resilience discourse to be much 
more fully elaborated by different proponents. The one size fits all approach to 
recovery and resilience is not adequate nor is it appropriate in the context of a 
progressive politics of emotional distress aimed at greater social justice for 
those who experience mental distress. Indeed, we would argue that positive 
psychology does little to move the debate on, as it continues to be constituted 
by the ghost of psychological deficits. Talking about strengths simply 
privileges the other side of the binary opposition of deficit-strength.  We need, 
instead, to challenge this opposition.  Secondly, one way of distinguishing 
different approaches to recovery and resilience is how they conceptualize the 
political (and the social and the economic) in the experience of emotional 
distress (both individually and collectively). We do not discount the need for 
recovery and resilience approaches to give a central importance to individual 
experience but it is absolutely vital that the conceptualization of individual 
experience is one that can be tied back to collective and structural 
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